Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285), in his commentary on Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s theological work titled al-Arba’in, objects to Razi’s assertion that “Everything that is in need of another (muftaqir/مفتقر) is contingent (mumkin).” According to Qarafi, every contingent is in need, but not every being in need is contingent. For the contingent is that which is in need of another in terms of its existence. That is to say, the contingent is that whose existence is not from itself, and which requires another in order to exist. This is a restricted state of need. However, the state of absolute need is more general than need in terms of existence. Because need occurs sometimes in terms of existence as in the case of the contingent (i), sometimes in terms of subsistence (qiyam) like the need of an attribute for that which it qualifies (mawsuf) (ii), or sometimes in terms of composition (tarkib) like the need of the whole for its parts (iii). Therefore, a thing being in need of another thing (absolute need) is more general than its being in need in its existence (contingent). Accordingly, the relationship between contingency (imkan) and need (ihtiyaj) is not one of equality (musawat) as the Imam thought, but rather one of general-specific (umum-khusus). In other words, while the proposition “Every contingent is in need” is true, the proposition “Every being in need is contingent” is false. For only some beings in need are contingent. Therefore, a thing may be in need of another thing in a respect other than existence, without being in need in terms of existence. For example, while an accident (arad) is in need of a substance (jawhar) for its subsistence, it is not in need of the substance in respect to its existence.

After this introduction, Qarafi connects the issue to his main topic of discussion, which is that God Almighty’s attributes are not contingent, but rather they are necessary: “It is impossible for God’s attributes to subsist on their own, independently of the essence (that is, without relying on the essence in any way). Nevertheless, the attributes are independent of an effector (mu’aththir). The existence of the attributes is from their own essences (bal wujudha min dhatiha/بل وجودها من ذاتها). For if their existence originated from something else and relied upon something else, this other thing would be an effector upon them. However, since there is no effector other than God, and also because God Almighty is a voluntary agent (fa’il mukhtar) and not one who necessitates by His essence (mujib bi’l-dhat), and because the intention to create something is only possible in the case of that thing’s non-existence, the proofs have already been mentioned earlier [in the relevant sections of the book] that the act of a voluntary agent must be originated (hadith). In this case [i.e., if we accept along with the proofs that the attributes rely on an effector], the attributes would have to be originated, and consequently the essence would have to be a locus for originated things, but this is impossible.

Thus, the concept of need is more general than specific contingency (imkan khass), and it is not correct to deduce the more specific by means of something more general. Therefore, it would also not be correct to present the absolute need resulting from composition (of attribute and that which is qualified) as a proof for the contingency (of the attributes). (In other words, the composition of essence and attribute in the referent of the majestic word “Allah” and the reliance of the attributes in the composition on that which they qualify, do not necessitate that His attributes are contingent.)

Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi, Sharh al-Arba’in fi usul al-din, ed. Nizar Hammadi, Tunis: Dar Imam Ibn Arafa, pp. 510-11